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Abstract
We consider the optimal contract between an entrepreneur and investors in a single-period
model when both parties have limited liability, are risk-neutral toward cash flow risk, and are
ambiguity-averse. Ambiguity aversion is modeled by multiplier preferences for robustness toward
model uncertainty, as in Hansen and Sargent (2001). Efficient ambiguity-sharing implies that
the first-best contract consists of either convertible debt or levered equity. As is customary,
in the second-best contract, moral hazard is alleviated by giving more cash to investors in low
cash flow states. Under many settings in our model, the optimal security has an equity-like
component in high cash flow states, providing a contrast to the results in Innes (1990).
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ipants at the Minnesota Corporate Finance Conference and Finance Theory Group Conference for helpful comments.
†George Mason University; slee65@gmu.edu
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Uncertainty is one of the fundamental facts of life. It is as ineradicable from business
decisions as from those in any other field.
—Frank H. Knight (1921), Part III, Chapter XII.
1 Introduction
Startup firms face uncertain futures. To be successful, a startup firm must provide consumers with
a new product or service. It is difficult to predict many of the factors that affect the cash flows
to the new firm. These factors may be external (the degree to which consumers will like the new
product, the response by rival firms currently in the market, the possibility of future disruptive
technological change) or internal (the ability to execute on a strategic plan and to manage growth)
to the startup firm. The firm therefore faces uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921)—an inability
to quantify the probabilities over different future outcomes.1 Indeed, according to Knight, profit is
a reward to an entrepreneur for bearing uncertainty.
As the Ellsberg (1961) paradox demonstrates, individuals are averse to uncertainty, preferring
gambles with known probabilities to those with unknown probabilities. Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) resolve the Ellsberg paradox by postulating a multiple priors model. A subject does not
have enough information to form a prior belief; rather, she has in mind a set of prior distributions
and believes that any one of them may be the true prior. Further, she is averse to this ambiguity, and
evaluates a gamble according to the minimal expected utility over all priors in this set. Hansen and
Sargent (2001) extend the maxmin expected utility notion of Gilboa and Schmeidler by adding on a
penalty function for evaluating gambles according to different distributions, based on the distance
of a distribution from some reference measure. The interpretation is that the agent understands
that her reference model may be misspecified, and wishes to make a decision that is robust to an
error in specifying the model.
In this paper, we consider the implications of ambiguity-aversion on the part of both an en-
trepreneur and investors for security design. We build upon the model of Innes (1990). The
entrepreneur has a project for which he needs to raise external financing. After the investment,
the entrepreneur takes a costly action that affects the distribution of future cash flows from the
project. Both parties are risk-neutral; that is, for both parties, the value of a gamble with known
probabilities is equal to the expected cash flow from the gamble. In addition, both have limited
liability. However, both are ambiguity-averse. We adopt the approach to ambiguity aversion of
Hansen and Sargent (2001). The investors and the entrepreneur in our model are concerned about
model misspecification, and are averse to this prospect.
In the Innes (1990) model, if incentive compatibility binds, the optimal security gives all cash
to investors in low cash flow states and all cash to the entrepreneur in high states. If the security
is required to have non-decreasing payments, the optimal security is a debt contract, leaving all
1In contrast, outcomes with known probabilities are termed “risky” rather than “uncertain.”
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cash to the investors in low states and a fixed payment to them in high states. The model is both
elegant and simple.
However, most venture capital contracts do not conform to its stark predictions. Indeed, Gom-
pers and Lerner (2001) define venture capital in terms of its “focus on equity or equity-linked
investments” in private high-growth firms. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) report that, in all of the
213 deals in their sample, venture capitalists retain substantial cash flow rights in high states of
the world. The most common form of security in their sample is convertible preferred stock, with
the investor having the option to convert to common stock in case of an exit (such as an IPO or
an acquisition by another firm). The few deals that do not include any convertible security include
common stock as one of the securities issued to investors. There is, therefore, a substantial gap
between the results of the Innes model and actual securities used in venture capital transactions.
As Schmidt (2003) and Hellmann (2006) show, double moral hazard (i.e., moral hazard on the
part of both entrepreneur and investors) leads to the use of convertible securities in venture capital
settings. We provide a different explanation for the existence of convertible features—ambiguity
aversion on both sides.
Our main insight is that ambiguity-aversion generates gains to trade from ambiguity-sharing,
which generally necessitates the presence of equity-like features in the optimal security. We begin
by considering the first-best case, in which the entrepreneur’s effort is directly contractible. In this
case, the optimal security involves sharing cash flow proportionally between the investors and the
entrepreneur in high cash flow states. Thus, the optimal security directly has an equity component.
Depending on how cash flows are split up in low states of the world, it is interpretable as either
convertible debt or levered equity, with unlevered equity arising in a knife-edge case.
When effort is not contractible, the contract must induce an incentive compatibile action from
the entrepreneur. Compared to the security in the first-best contract, this requires the investors to
obtain more cash in low cash flow states. We demonstrate the conditions that must be satisfied by
the optimal contract (which consists of a security issued to investors and the level of effort to be
undertaken by the entrepreneur), and generate a number of numerical examples to understand the
features of the security and the comparative statics of the problem.
We find that the division of cash flow in high cash flow states depends on the degree of ambi-
guity aversion of both investors and entrepreneur. First, suppose that the entrepreneur has high
ambiguity-aversion. The security is not linear in this case due to the binding incentive compat-
ibility constraint, but has an equity-like feature to the extent that the payment increases in the
cash flow from the project.2 As investors become less ambiguity-averse, they have a greater pref-
erence (relative to the entrepreneur) for receiving cash in high states, which increases the slope of
the optimal security. Next, suppose the entrepreneur has low ambiguity-aversion. Relative to the
2Convertible securities in the venture capital setting often have complicated participation features that can create
non-linearities in their payments; see Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003).
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investors, the entrepreneur prefers to receive cash in high states. In addition solving the incentive
problem requires withholding cash from the entrepreneur in low states. These two factors reinforce
each other, so the security held by the investors can have a non-monotonic payment, with regions
in which its payment decreases as the project cash flow increases.
Finally, we require the investors and the entrepreneur to both hold claims whose payments
are non-decreasing in the project cash flow. Then, in the latter case in which the entrepreneur is
not too ambiguity-averse, the optimal security is debt (recovering the Innes result) if investors are
extremely ambiguity-averse. If investors too are not very ambiguity-averse, the optimal security is
convertible debt, with conversion feasible only sufficiently high states.
Overall, we find that debt emerges as the optimal security only in the event that the security is
required to have non-decreasing payments, the entrepreneur has a low degree of ambiguity-aversion
and the investors are significantly more ambiguity-averse. In all other settings, the security offers
some payment to the investors in high cash flow states. Further, when the entrepreneur is sufficiently
ambiguity-averse, the security offers non-decreasing payments without requiring that feature to be
imposed, and has a strong resemblance to equity.
We adopt the Hansen and Sargent (2001) approach to modeling ambiguity aversion, specifically
using what they term “multiplier preferences” to capture the notion that the agent cares about
robustness toward model misspecification. In these preferences, a parameter is included that de-
scribes the degree of aversion the agent has toward model uncertainty. An alternative would be to
model the degree of ambiguity aversion using the smooth ambiguity aversion approach of Klibanoff
et al. (2005). We find the Hansen and Sargent approach more tractable in our setting. Multiplier
preferences are a special case of a larger set of preferences, variational preferences. Maccheroni
et al. (2006) provide an axiomatization of variational preferences, and Strzalecki (2011) extends the
axiomatization to multiplier preferences.
Our model is static, with the contract design and entrepreneur action both occurring at date
0. Two recent papers, Miao and Rivera (2016) and Szydlowski (2012), study robust contracts in
continuous time, assuming that the principal (but not the agent) has ambiguous beliefs. In Miao
and Rivera (2016), the principal does not know the output distribution chosen by the agent, but the
agent does. They determine the optimal dynamic contract and exhibit an implementation featuring
cash, debt, and equity. In the venture capital context, venture capitalists are often thought to have
a better knowledge of the industry and the prospects for a firm than the entrepreneur, so it is
reasonable to think of both investors and entrepreneur as facing model uncertainty.3 Szydlowski
(2012) models a cost of effort for the agent that changes over time. The agent naturally knows his
own effort cost, but the principal is uncertain about it. Ambiguity leads to excessive compensation
3There is, of course, a distinction between whether an agent faces model uncertainty and whether the agent is
averse to that uncertainty. The latter is a preference characteristic, and an agent may well be ambiguity-neutral
despite facing a high degree of uncertainty.
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following a high performance, and under-compensation following a low performance.
Bewley (1989) builds a theory of innovation and entrepreneurship based on uncertainty aversion.
In his model, entrepreneurship is undertaken by individual investors with low levels of uncertainty
aversion. In our model, the entrepreneur and investors are distinct entities. Arguably, in the
venture capital arena, uncertainty aversion is low (relative to the population) among both investors
and founders.
In many settings in our context, the optimal security has equity-like features. As mentioned
earlier, Schmidt (2003) and Hellmann (2006) explain these features in venture capital contracts on
the basis of double moral hazard. Convertible debt also emerges if the entrepreneur is risk-averse
and contracts can be renegotiated (Dewatripont and Matthews (2003)) or if the investor is risk-
averse and the entrepreneur can engage in risk-shifting (Ozerturk (2008)). Stein (1992) takes a
different approach to the use of convertible debt by large firms. In his model, convertible debt is a
form of backdoor equity financing, to avoid the usual adverse selection discount to equity. Finally,
Ortner and Schmalz (2016) consider an optimistic entrepreneur issuing a security to an investor who
is more pessimistic, and show that convertible debt can emerge when the project has an embedded
expansion option. We note that ambiguity aversion may be thought of as a micro-foundation for
belief disagreement. To the extent that agents have different degrees of ambiguity aversion, they
are effectively evaluating outcomes under different probability distributions.
Our paper adds to the recent literature on the ambiguity aversion in corporate finance settings.
For example, in the model of Dicks and Fulghieri (2015), ambiguity-aversion leads to endogenous
disagreement between firm insiders and external shareholders, thus creating a motive for gover-
nance. Relatedly, Garlappi et al. (2015) show that, in settings such as corporate boards, the group
in the aggregate can act like an ambiguity-averse decision-maker. Ambiguity-aversion also explains
innovation and merger waves, by generating a strategic complementarity in investment in innovtive
projects (Dicks and Fulghieri (2016)).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief introduction to the Hansen and
Sargent (2001) multiplier preferences approach in Section 2. The model is introduced in Section 3,
and the first-best contract is described. The solution to the full contracting problem is exhibited
in Section 4, with and without a monotonicity requirement on security payments.
2 Multiplier Preferences and Ambiguity Aversion
In this section, we briefly review multiplier preferences, which were introduced by Hansen and
Sargent (2001) to capture model uncertainty; that is, the notion that a decision-maker does not
know the true probability distribution of events, and is averse to model misspecification.
Consider a set of states (events) X. We define a payoff profile r : X 7→ Z, where Z is a set
of consequences, and define Bernoulli utility function u : Z 7→ R. Let Σ denote a sigma-algebra
of events in X. Let ∆(X) denote the set of all countably-additive probability measures on X.
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Given a measure q, with a slight abuse of notation, let ∆(q) denote the set of probability measures
equivalent to q.
Then, given a probability measure q, an expected utility maximizer evaluates a payoff profile r
according to the criterion U(r) =
∫
X
u(r(x)) dq(x). The expected utility maximizer prefers payoff
profile r1 to r2 if and only if U(r1) ≥ U(r2).
Now, consider a decision-maker who has a reference probability measure q, but is uncertain
about the true measure. Here, q may be thought of as the decision-maker’s “best guess” about the
true probabilities over events. Given any other measure p ∈ ∆(q), the relative entropy R(p||q) is
defined by
R(p||q) =

∫
X
(
ln p(x)q(x)
)
dp(x) if p ∈ ∆(q)
∞ otherwise
(1)
The relative entropy R(·||q) (also called the Kullback-Leibler divergence between p and q) provides
a distance metric between p and q. It is non-negative, and equal to zero if and only if p = q (see
Dupuis and Ellis (1997), Lemma 1.4.1). Moreover, it is convex in p (see Dupuis and Ellis (1997),
Lemma 1.4.3).
According to the multiplier preferences introduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001), when faced
with a payoff profile with a reference measure q, the decision-maker allows for the notion that
his reference measure may be incorrect, and therefore allows himself to evaluate the payoff profile
according to some other measure p that is close to q. Probability measures far from q are given
greater weight in the decision, and so are considered more costly to choose. Specifically, the
decision-maker evaluates a payoff profile r with reference measure q according to
V (r) = min
p∈∆(q)
∫
X
u(r(x))dp(x) + θR(p||q), (2)
where θ > 0. A payoff profile r1 is preferred to r2 if and only if V (r1) ≥ V (r2), and the decision-
maker’s goal is to maximize V .
Here, θ is inversely related to the degree of ambiguity aversion on the part of the decision-
maker (see Maccheroni et al. (2006), Corollary 21). Specifically, it captures the extent of the
decision-maker’s aversion to the risk that the model (or reference measure q) has been misspecified.
Intuitively, one can think of the decision-maker choosing a distribution p according to which to
evaluate the lottery q. As θ becomes large, the penalty for choosing a distribution far from the
reference distribution q increases, which naturally leads to a distribution closer to q being chosen.
That is, as θ becomes large, the decision-maker is less concerned with model misspecification (as
they believe that the true measure is close to the reference measure), or is less ambiguity-averse.
In the limit as θ → ∞, the probability distribution p that minimizes the right-hand-side of
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equation (2) must equal q, so we have V (r) = U(r) for a given payoff profile r. That is, the decision
criterion reduces to the usual notion of maximizing expected utility. Conversely, as θ → 0, the
decision-maker becomes infinitely ambiguity averse.
From Dupuis and Ellis (1997), Proposition 1.4.2 (see also Strzalecki (2011), Section 3.3),
min
p∈∆(q)
∫
X
u(r(x))dp(x) + θR(p||q) = −θ ln
(∫
X
e−
u(r(x))
θ dq(x)
)
. (3)
Therefore, a decision-maker maximizing the LHS of equation (3) may equivalently be modeled as
maximizing the RHS, so that we can write
V (r) = −θ ln
(∫
X
e−
u(r(x))
θ dq(x)
)
. (4)
Going forward, for the rest of the paper, we will assume that all parties have ambiguity-averse
preferences represented as in equation (4).
3 Security Design Problem
We build upon the model of Innes (1990). A penniless entrepreneur has a project that requires
an investment I at date 0. The investment I must therefore be raised from external investors.
The project generates a cash flow x ∈ X = [0, x] at date 1, which is then shared between the
investors and the entrepreneur. By assumption, the cash flow x is non-negative. Let r(x) denote
the amount given to the investors, and w(x) = x− r(x) the amount retained by the entrepreneur.
Both entrepreneur and investors have limited liability, so 0 ≤ r(x) ≤ x for all x. The function r(·)
is naturally interpretable as a financial security, so that the choice of r is a security design problem.
After the investment is undertaken, the entrepreneur takes an action, or equivalently provides
an effort, a ≥ 0, which incurs a utility cost ψ(a). The cost is strictly increasing and strictly convex
in a, so that ψ′(a) > 0 and ψ′′(a) > 0. In addition, we assume that ψ(0) = 0. Investors and
entrepreneurs agree on the effect that the cost has on the reference measure induced over the cash
flows by the action a. In particular, they believe that action a likely leads to a distribution F (x | a)
over cash flows at date 1, with associated density f(x | a). We assume that F (x | a) has full support
over X and has no mass points.
We assume that f(x | a) satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). Denote
fa(x | a) = ∂f(x|a)∂a . Then, ∂∂a
(
fa(x|a)
f(x|a)
)
> 0.
Entrepreneur and investors are both neutral toward cash flow risk, so that u(x) = x for both
parties. However, both are ambiguity-averse in the sense of being averse to risk of model mis-
specification. Investors value risky cash flows according to equation (4), with ambiguity-aversion
6
parameter θI . That is, the value to investors of a security r(x) when the action is a is given by
VI(r, a) = −θI ln
(∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx
)
(5)
Similarly, the entrepreneur evaluates risky cash flows according to equation (4), with ambiguity-
aversion parameter θE . In addition, the entrepreneur privately bears the cost of the action, ψ(a).
Therefore, given an action a and a security r(x) offered to investors, the entrepreneur’s value for
the contract is
VE(r, a) = −θE ln
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
− ψ(a). (6)
Without loss of generality, we set the discount rate between date 0 and date 1 to zero. The invest-
ment I has no uncertainty associated with it. It is straightforward to see that−θI ln
(∫
X
e
− I
θI f(x | a)dx
)
=
I, so that we can write the investors’ individual rationality, or IR, constraint as:
−θI ln
(∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx
)
≥ I. (7)
Because the action a is taken after the investment has been made, it cannot be committed to
by the entrepreneur. Instead, as is usual, a must be incentive compatible. The relevant incentive
compatibility (IC) condition for the entrepreneur is
a = arg max
a˜
−θE ln
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a˜)dx
)
− ψ(a˜). (8)
For now, we assume the first-order approach is valid (later we specify a sufficient condition for this).
We therefore replace the IC condition in equation (8) with the corresponding first-order condition
−θE
∫
X e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx∫
X e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
− ψ′(a) = 0. (9)
The complete contracting problem may therefore be stated as:
[Problem P1] maxr(x),a −θE ln
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
− ψ(a) (10)
subject to: (IR) − θI ln
(∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx
)
≥ I (11)
(IC) − θE
∫
X e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x|a)dx∫
X e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x|a)dx
− ψ′(a) = 0. (12)
(LL) 0 ≤ r(x) ≤ x for all x. (13)
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Here, (LL) represents the limited liability constraints on the security. We refer to the pair (r, a) as
a contract, and to r as a security.
We assume that a feasible solution exists to this problem. Essentially, that requires that, given
the conditional density over cash flows f(x | a), the effort cost function ψ(a), and the set of feasible
cash flows X, the required investment level I is sufficiently low.
We first transform the maximization problem P1 into an equivalent minimization problem P2
that does not require the use of natural logs. The benefit is that when we determine the first-order
conditions in r and a, the corresponding derivatives have a simpler form.
[Problem P2] minr(x),a e
ψ(a)
θE
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
(14)
subject to: (IR2)
∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx ≤ e−
I
θI (15)
(IC2)
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx+ ψ
′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx = 0 (16)
(LL) 0 ≤ r(x) ≤ x for all x. (17)
Lemma 1. Problems P1 and P2 have the same set of solutions.
All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
Before we exhibit the optimal contract in our model, we briefly review the results from Innes
(1990). Our model is identical to the Innes model except for the feature of ambiguity aversion
on the part of investors and entrepreneur. In the limit, as θI → ∞ and θE → ∞, investors and
entrepreneurs become ambiguity-neutral in our model, so that in the limiting case the model reduces
exactly to the Innes model.
Three benchmark results from Innes (1990) are of interest to us: (1) In the Innes model, in the
first-best outcome security design is irrelevant, as both investors and entrepreneur are risk-neutral.
That is, as long as the effort is at the first-best level and the investors’ IR constraint holds, any
division of project cash flows between the two parties is optimal. (2) In the second-best problem,
if the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility (IC) condition binds, the optimal security provides all
cash flows to investors in low states, and all cash flows to the entrepreneur in high states.4 (3) If
the security held by investors must provide payments to them that are weakly monotone in the
cash flow x, the optimal security is debt.
3.1 First-best Problem
In the first-best problem, incentive compatibility is not an issue, or, put another way, we can
think of the action as being directly contractible. The contract can specify an effort level a, and
a security r that specifies cash flows to investors, contingent on the cash flows of the project, if
4In the second-best problem, incentive compatibility may or may not bind, depending on how high I is relative
to the distribution over cash flows at date 1, given the optimal effort level.
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the entrepreneur in fact chooses action a. As effort is contractible, if the entrepreneur chooses
any action a˜ 6= a, investors can give the entrepreneur zero cash and retain the entire output x for
themselves.
Let λ denote the shadow price for the investors’ IR constraint in equation (15). Further, for
each x, let γ
x
denote the shadow price on the constraint r(x) ≥ 0 and γx the shadow price for the
constraint r(x) ≤ x. Then, the Lagrangian for the first-best problem may be written as:
Lf (r, a, λ) = e
ψ(a)
θE
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
+ λ
[∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx− e−
I
θI
]
+
∫
X
[
−γ
x
r(x) + γx(r(x)− x)
]
dx (18)
Let af denote the optimal effort level in the first-best problem, rf the optimal security, and λf
the shadow price of the investors’ IR constraint given the first-best contract. Finally, given y ∈ R,
let y+ = max{0, y}.
We show that the solution to the first-best contract produces a security that is piecewise-linear
in the project cash flow x. The entrepreneur and investors face two sources of unexpected outcomes
in this problem: cash flow risk and model uncertainty. Cash flow risk is represented by the reference
density f(x | a), and both parties are neutral toward it. Model uncertainty implies that the true
cash flow distribution may be different from the reference distribution, and investors are averse to
it. The latter creates a motive for ambiguity-sharing that leads to an outcome in which high cash
flows are shared between investors and entrepreneur. Depending on the ambiguity aversion of each
side, low cash flows may be given entirely to the investors or entirely to the entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1. In any solution to the first-best problem,
(i) The investors’ IR constraint binds.
(ii) The optimal security satisfies
rf (x) = min
{
x,
(
θI
θI + θE
x+
θIθE
θI + θE
(
ln
λfθE
θI
− ln e
ψ(af )
θE
))+}
. (19)
Suppose that for some value of x, we have a strictly interior solution for rf (x); that is, rf (x) ∈
(0, x). Equation (19) says that in this case, rf (x) =
θI
θI+θE
x+ θIθEθI+θE
(
ln
λfθE
θI
− ln e
ψ(af )
θE
)
. Observe
that the term inside the parentheses does not depend on x, so that rf is linear in x.
5 The linear
term θIθI+θE x reflects optimal ambiguity-sharing between investors and entrepreneur. The linearity
of the term follows from the exponential form of the expressions in problem P2, the transformed
5Also, of course, ln e
ψ(af )
θE =
ψ(af )
θE
. We state the contract using the expression ln e
ψ(af )
θE to facilitate comparison
with the second-best contract in the next section.
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problem.6 It follows that the payoff on the security is weakly increasing in x, and is overall piecewise
linear in x.
The intuition behind the first term θIθI+θE x is as follows. Recall that θI is inversely related to
the degree of ambiguity aversion expressed by the investors, and likewise θE is inversely related
to the ambiguity aversion of the entrepreneur. The more ambiguity-averse an agent is (i.e., the
lower θ is), the further (and so the more pessimistic) the distribution under which they evaluate
the cash flows is, compared to the reference measure f(x | a). A pessimistic agent places greater
weight on low cash flow outcomes, and so prefers to receive cash in those low states. Conversely, a
less ambiguity-averse agent is relatively optimistic, and so prefers to receive cash in high cash flow
states.
Now, keeping the optimal effort af fixed, as θI increases, keeping θE fixed, the investors become
less ambiguity-averse relative to the entrepreneur. Optimal ambiguity-sharing thus entails that the
slope of the investors’ share of the cash flow increases, so that investors get relatively more cash
in the high states. Of course, as θI increases, the gains to ambiguity-sharing between the investors
and entrepreneur also change, which has a feedback effect on the optimal effort in the first-best
problem.
In addition to the investors’ IR constraint, equation (15), and the form of the security in
equation (19) (both mentioned in the statement of Proposition 1) the optimal action af satisfies
the first-order condition
∂Lf
∂a = 0, or
e
ψ(a)
θE
(
ψ′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx+
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx
)
+ λ
∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI fa(x | a)dx = 0. (20)
These three equations, (15), (19), and (20) can be used to solve for af , λf , and rf .
Note that we have assumed in our formulation that investors and entrepreneur have the same
reference density in mind f(x | a). Suppose, for example, investors evaluated cash flows based on
a reference density fI(x | a) 6= f(x | a). In that case, the relative optimism or pessimism of each
party will depend both on the coefficient θ and the reference measure used to evaluate cash flows.
As a result, the optimal security will depend at any x on both fI(x | a) and f(x | a).
3.2 Example
To illustrate the properties and comparative statics of the first-best contract, we consider the
following numeric example. Let X = [0, 1], and let the action set be A = [0, 1]. Set f(x | a) =
1 + a(2x − 1), so that fa(x | a) = 2x − 1 and faa(x | a) = 0. Note that fa(x|a)f(x|a) = 1a+ 1
2x−1
, which is
clearly increasing in x, so that MLRP is satisfied. Let ψ(a) = 12a
2, so that ψ′(a) = a and ψ′′(a) = 1.
Finally, let I = 0.3.
6Recall that, as shown by Wilson (1968), optimal risk-sharing with exponential utilities entails a linear sharing
rule.
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When both parties are ambiguity-neutral, i.e., in the case of the Innes (1990) model, the first-
best effort is found by solving the first-order condition
∫
X xfa(x | a)dx = ψ′(a), which in this
example yields a∗N =
1
6 (the subscript N denotes that both parties are ambiguity-neutral). Any
division of the cash flows such that in expectation the investors obtain I and the entrepreneur
obtains
∫
X xf(x | a)− I is optimal.
With ambiguity-aversion there are three possibilities for the optimal security issued to the
investors in the first-best case in this example. We illustrate these three cases by keeping θE fixed
at 1, and varying θI . In each case, the security issued in the first-best case includes a substantial
equity component.
1. Convertible debt.
This security emerges if θI is sufficiently low, relative to θE . As investors are pessimistic
relative to entrepreneurs, in the low cash flow states all cash is given to the investors. Their
financial claim therefore resembles debt in the low states. In the high cash flow states,
the motive for ambiguity-sharing kicks in, and cash flows are divided between investors and
entrepreneur using the linear sharing rule mentioned above. That is, once the cash flow
exceeds a threshold, both investors and entrepreneur own equity in the project. Putting the
two pieces together, the security is convertible debt with the conversion threshold set equal
to the face value of the debt.
2. Levered Equity.
This security emerges if θI is sufficiently high, relative to θE . Here, the entrepreneur
is pessimistic relative to investors, and obtains all cash in the low states. Once cash flow is
sufficiently high, we are back to the case in which ambiguity-sharing adds value, with both
parties holding equity claims. The security can therefore be characterized as levered equity,
with the entrepreneur holding priority over cash flows in low states.
3. Unlevered Equity.
This is a knife-edge case that emerges at a specific value of θI ; in the example, at θI
approximately equal to 1.422.
In each of the three cases, the equity fraction the investor obtains in the region in which cash
flows are shared is given by θIθI+θE . The entrepreneur has a financial claim that is the mirror image
of that issued to the investor. In the case that the entrepreneur has convertible debt, of course, his
financial claim can equivalently be interpreted as a salary (subject to the firm having the cash to
pay the salary) plus a stock bonus. We illustrate the different financial securities that emerge as
θI varies in Figure 1.
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This figure illustrates the securities issued to the investor as θI varies. We set f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x − 1),
ψ(a) = 12a
2, I = 0.3, and θE = 1.
Figure 1: Securities Issued to Investor in First-Best Contract
The optimal effort in the first-best contract falls as θI increases, which is intuitive. An increase
in θI implies that the entrepreneur receives more cash in the low cash flow states. Therefore, the
incentive to provide effort to reach the higher cash flow states is lower. Note that in this case,
the “total surplus” from the first-best contract depends on the preferences of both investors and
entrepreneur (because that determines the gains to ambiguity-sharing). Therefore, it depends also
on the level of investment, which affects how the gains from ambiguity-sharing are divided. As a
result, as shown in Table 1 below, the effort level for some parameter values may be greater than
the level when both parties are ambiguity neutral, 16 .
4 Second-best Problem
We now turn to the second-best problem. Recall that in this case effort is not directly contractible,
but rather must be chosen so as to be incentive compatible for the entrepreneur. Taking into
account the entrepreneur’s IC constraint in equation (16), the Lagrangian for problem P2 may be
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written as:
L(r, a, λ) = e
ψ(a)
θE
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
+ λ
[∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx− e−
I
θI
]
+µ
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx+ ψ
′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
+
∫
X
[
−γ
x
r(x) + γx(r(x)− x)
]
dx. (21)
Here, µ is the shadow price on the entrepreneur’s IC constraint, and, as before, λ is the shadow
price on the investors’ IR constraint, γ
x
the shadow price on the constraint r(x) ≥ 0, and γx the
shadow price on the constraint r(x) ≤ x.
As we show, the optimal security in the second-best problem entails a weak reduction in the
cash flow paid to the investors in high states. When the IC condition binds, the reduction is strict.
Essentially, relative to the first-best problem, more cash must be given to the entrepreneur in the
high states to induce effort.
Denote with a ∗ superscript the value of a variable in a solution to the second-best problem.
Proposition 2. In any solution to the second-best problem,
(i) The investors’ IR constraint binds.
(ii) The optimal security satisfies
r∗(x) = min
{
x,
(
θI
θI + θE
x+
θIθE
θI + θE
{
ln
λ∗θE
θI
− ln
(
e
ψ(a∗)
θE + µ∗
(
fa(x | a∗)
f(x | a∗) +
ψ′(a∗)
θE
))})+}
.(22)
For any value of x at which the cash flow is divided between investors and entrepreneur, equation
(22) implies that r∗(x) = θIθI+θE x +
θIθE
θI+θE
{
ln λ
∗θE
θI
− ln
(
e
ψ(a∗)
θE + µ∗
(
fa(x|a∗)
f(x|a∗) +
ψ′(a∗)
θE
))}
. As
before, the term θIθI+θE x is linear and increasing in x. However, the term
fa(x|a∗)
f(x|a∗) is also increasing
in x, so when µ > 0, the term in the curly parentheses is decreasing in x in some non-linear fashion.
As Innes (1990) shows, incentive compatibility may not bind in this case. In the Innes model,
whether IC binds depends on the level of investment, I, relative to the density over cash flows,
f(x | a). When I is low, IC does not bind, so that the contract reverts to a first-best contract.
However, when I is high, IC binds and µ > 0. A similar intuition goes through with ambiguity
aversion. We have shown that the first-best contract in our setting is piecewise linear and has an
equity component. For the rest of the paper, we concentrate on the case that the IC constraint
binds.
Two implications emerge when µ > 0: First, the security held by the investors overall is no
longer piecewise linear in x, and can have significant non-linear components. Therefore, the security
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is no longer directly interpretable in terms of equity, although it can have an equity-like component.
Second, the payoff on the security need not be weakly increasing in project cash flow—in particular,
there may exist ranges of cash flow such that the investors’ payout is decreasing as x increases. We
demonstrate this property in the context of a numerical example in the next section.
In the second-best case, the first-order condition in a is ∂L∂a = 0, which reduces to
λ
∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI fa(x | a)dx+ µ
{
ψ′′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−(r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx+ ψ
′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−(r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx
+
∫
X
e
−x−(r(x)
θE faa(x | a)dx
}
= 0. (23)
The four conditions represented by the above equation, the investors’ IR condition (15), the en-
trepreneur’s IC condition (16), and the equation for the optimal contract (22) can be used to solve
for a∗, λ∗, µ∗, and r∗ in the case that the IC condition binds, so that µ > 0.
4.1 Example
We use the same parameters as earlier. We set θE = 1, I = 0.3, f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x − 1), and
ψ(a) = 12a
2. The first-best security for three different values of θI is exhibited in Figure 1. We
illustrate the optimal security in the second-best setting in Figure 2. To illustrate the difference
between the first and second-best contracts, we choose parameter values at which the IC constraint
binds in the second-best problem.
In contrast to the security in the first-best case, the optimal security in the second-best case
provides more cash flow to the investors in low states. This is true for all three levels of θI .
In the figures, the contrast is greatest for the intermediate θI case (with θI = 1.422), with the
first-best contract entailing straight equity, but the security in the second-best contract resembling
convertible debt. Note that the securities in Figure 2 are not piecewise linear—for high cash flows,
there is a slight non-linearity in the security payoffs. Therefore, they cannot be thought of directly
in terms of equity. Nevertheless, for these parameter values, the securities have a component that
resembles equity to a large degree.
There is a natural tension in the problem between ambiguity-sharing and the need to provide
incentives to the entrepreneur. That is, the usual trade-off between risk and incentives is resurrected
by as a trade-off between uncertainty and incentives. On the one hand, if the entrepreneur were
ambiguity-neutral, the moral hazard problem would entail giving the entrepreneur less cash in low
states. On the other hand, optimal ambiguity-sharing involves the investor receiving less cash in
low states and more cash in high states. The design of the security, in turn, feeds back into the
moral hazard problem, and affects the optimal effort provided by the agent.
We report the optimal effort levels in the first- and second-best problems in our example in
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This figure illustrates the securities issued to the investor as θI varies. We set f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x − 1),
ψ(a) = 12a
2, I = 0.3, and θE = 1.
Figure 2: Securities Issued to Investor in Second-Best Contract
θI 0.5 1.422 10
First-best effort 0.176 0.168 0.165
Second-best effort 0.096 0.082 0.052
Table 1: Optimal Effort Levels
Table 1.
Next, we consider the comparative statics of the optimal security as θE changes. We use the
same cost function, conditional cash flow density, and investment level as before. We set θI = 4
and vary θE across three levels, 1, 4, and 20. The optimal security in each case is exhibited in
Figure 3.
The broad intuition is as follows. The optimal security balances out the need for ambiguity-
sharing, which entails giving more cash to the less ambiguity-averse party in high states, with the
need to provide incentives to the entrepreneur, which entails giving more (often all) cash to the
investor in low states. As θE increases, the entrepreneur becomes less ambiguity-averse, and so
starts to get paid in lower states. Further, the slope of the optimal security falls, reflecting the fact
that the entrepreneur obtains a greater proportion of the cash in high states.
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This figure illustrates how the optimal security changes as θE changes. Throughout, we set θI = 4, I =
0.3, ψ(a) = 12a
2, and f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x− 1).
Figure 3: Optimal Security as θE Changes
When the entrepreneur has sufficiently lower ambiguity aversion than the entrepreneur, the
optimal security can have a payout that over some range is decreasing in cash flow, a security that
provides the entrepreneur with large amounts of cash in the high cash flow states provides the best
incentives, because the entrepreneur is relatively confident in the reference probability measure
f(x | a). In our example, when θE = 20, the security payoffs decrease in the project cash flow when
x exceeds approximately 0.6.
Finally, we note that, although it is not immediate from the figure, the security payoffs are non-
linear in x in the region in which the cash flow is being shared between investors and entrepreneur.
4.2 Second-Best Contract with Monotone Security Payoffs
As shown in Proposition 1, the security contained in the first-best contract has a payoff that is
weakly increasing in x. Further, there exists a threshold xˆ such that the security is strictly increasing
and linear in x for x ≥ xˆ. Further, in many settings, the security issued in the second-best contract
also has a payoff weakly increasing in x. For example, fixing a value of θI , if θE is sufficiently low, a
security with increasing payoffs provides the entrepreneur with a hedge against model uncertainty.
Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 3, when θE is high relative to θI , a security with payoffs that
decrease when x is high provides the entrepreneur with high-powered incentives. In such situations,
we consider the implications of introducing another restriction on the security, that the payoffs must
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be non-decreasing in cash flow.
We assume throughout this section that both r(x) and w(x) = x−r(x) must be non-decreasing in
x. These assumptions imply that security is continuous in x and is differentiable almost everywhere
(i.e., except over a set of measure zero). We therefore operationalize this assumption by adding
an extra condition (M) to problem P2, that r′(x) ≥ 0 for almost all x. In addition, as w(x) is
non-decreasing, it must be that r′(x) ≤ 1. The full contracting problem is then:
[Problem P3] minr(x),a e
ψ(a)
θE
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
subject to: (IR2)
∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx ≤ e−
I
θI
(IC2)
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx+ ψ
′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx = 0
(LL) 0 ≤ r(x) ≤ x for all x.
(M) 0 ≤ r′(x) ≤ 1 for almost all x.
Given Proposition 2, denote
r˜(x) =
θI
θI + θE
x+
θIθE
θI + θE
{
ln
λθE
θI
− ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
))}
. (24)
Further, define rˆ(x) = min{max{r˜(x), 0}, x}, so that rˆ(x) ensures that limited liability is satisfied
for both entrepreneur and investors.
At any given x at which rˆ(x) is differentiable, there are two possibilities: (i) rˆ′(x) ≥ 0, in which
case condition (M) is satisfied at that value of x, or (ii) rˆ′(x) < 0, in which case condition (M) is
violated at that x. In the latter case, define m(x) = sup{y ≤ x | r′(y) ≥ 0}. Finally, define
rM (x) =
{
rˆ(x) if rˆ′(x) ≥ 0
rˆ(m(x)) otherwise.
(25)
Then, the optimal contract once condition (M) is added to the problem includes rˆM as the
security issued to the investors. Let (aM , λM , µM ) denote values at which problem P3 is solved,
given that the security issued is rM .
Proposition 3. In any solution to problem P3,
(i) The investors’ IR constraint binds.
(ii) The security issued to the investors is rM (x), evaluated at (aM , λM , µM ).
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That is, the payoff of the security at any cash flow x is determined as in Proposition 3, and any
decreasing portions are “flattened” so that the eventual payoff is weakly increasing. Of course, in
doing so, the values of a, λ, and µ will all change.
The proof of the proposition uses optimal control techniques similar to those used in ironing in
a standard mechanism design problem with unknown types.
To illustrate the application of Proposition 3, we revert to our running example. Let ψ(a) = 12a
2
and f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x− 1). Consider two examples of monotonic contracts.
First, set θI = 4 and θE = 20. In Figure 3, we exhibit the payoff on the optimal security when
monotonicity is not imposed. As seen from the figure, the security has decreasing payoffs for x
greater than approximately 0.6. If the security is required to be monotone, the optimal security is
debt. It has a payoff r(x) = x for x ≤ approximately 0.53, and r(x) ≈ 0.53 for x > 0.36.
As a second example, set θI = 20 and θE = 10.5. We exhibit the second-best contract with and
without condition (M) in Figure 4. To highlight the effects of condition (M), we change the scale
of the Y -axis to display the relevant region of rM (x).
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This figure illustrates the effect of requiring the security to have weakly increasing payoffs. We set θI =
20, θE = 10.5, I = 0.3, ψ(a) =
1
2a
2, and f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x− 1).
Figure 4: Optimal Security With and Without Monotonicity Requirement
Overall, then, we find that when the entrepreneur is ambiguity-averse (i.e., θE is low) and
investors are mildly ambiguity-averse relative to the entrepreneur (i.e., θI is sufficiently high rela-
tive to θE), the optimal security has strictly increasing payoffs. When the entrepreneur is mildly
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ambiguity-averse (i.e., θE is high), the optimal security can have segments in which its payoff de-
creases in project cash flow. In this case, introducing the additional restriction that security payoffs
are non-decreasing in x leads to either standard debt (when investors are ambiguity-averse, so θI is
low) or a security that resembles convertible debt with a high strike price for the conversion option
(when investors are only mildly ambiguity-averse, so that θI is high).
4.3 Validity of first-order approach
We now identify a sufficient condition for the first-order approach to incentive compatibility to be
valid in our problem. As in equation (6), let VE denote the entrepreneur’s payoff. Let w(x) = x−
r(x); then VE = −θE ln
(∫
X
e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−w(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
−ψ(a) = −θE ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−w(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
.
Denote U = e
−VE
θE = e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−w(x)
θE f(x | a)dx. Then, if action a maximizes VE , it must minimize
U .
A sufficient condition for U to have a local minimum in a is ∂
2U
∂a2
> 0. Differentiate U twice with
respect to a. Then, at any point at which the entrepreneurs’ IC condition is satisfied, we obtain
∂2U
∂a2
= e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−w(x)
θE f(x | a)
[
ψ′′(a)
θE
+
ψ′(a)
θE
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
faa(x | a)
f(x | a)
]
dx.
Because e
ψ(a)
θE > 0, for ∂
2U
∂a2
> 0, it is sufficient for a local minimum that∫
X
e
−w(x)
θE f(x | a)
[
ψ′′(a)
θE
+
ψ′(a)
θE
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
faa(x | a)
f(x | a)
]
dx > 0 (26)
If the equation is satisfied for all a, then U is strictly concave in a, so we have a global minimum.
Note that a sufficient condition for (26) to be satisfied at a given effort level a is that
ψ′′(a) + ψ′(a)
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) + θE
faa(x | a)
f(x | a) ≥ 0 for all x. (27)
Condition (26) can also be expressed in terms of the distribution function F . Applying in-
tegration by parts repeatedly to equation (26) and simplifying, an equivalent sufficient condition
is
e
−w(x)
θE
ψ′′(a)
θE
+
∫
X
w′(x)
θE
e
−w(x)
θE F (x | a)
(
ψ′′(a)
θE
+
ψ′(a)
θE
Fa(x | a)
F (x | a) +
Faa(x | a)
F (x | a)
)
dx > 0 (28)
This condition is satisfied at a given effort level a if ψ′′(a) + ψ′(a)θE
Fa(x|a)
F (x|a) + θE
Faa(x|a)
F (x|a) > 0 for all
x.
In our numerical examples, we set f(x | a) = 1 + a(2x − 1), so that fa(x | a) = 2x − 1 and
faa(x | a) = 0. Therefore, the minimum value of fa(x|a)f(x|a) is − 11−a , attained when x = 0. Further,
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ψ(a) = 12a
2, so that ψ′(a) = a and ψ′′(a) = 1. Therefore, in the examples,
ψ′′(a) + ψ′(a)
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) + θE
faa(x | a)
f(x | a) = 1 +
a
a+ 12x−1
. (29)
The minimum value of the RHS is 1− a1−a , attained when x = 0. Therefore, if a ≤ 12 , condition (27)
is satisfied for all x. The entrepreneur’s payoff is therefore concave for a ∈ [0, 0.5]. In the examples,
the values of effort we find are considerably less than 0.5, so we have identified a minimum over the
range [0, 0.5]. Further, the marginal cost of effort at a = 0.5 is sufficiently high that higher values
of a are not optimal for the entrepreneur.
5 Conclusion
We extend the Innes (1990) model of an entrepreneur and investors (both of whom have limited
liability and are risk-neutral) to allow for ambiguity-aversion, using the multiplier preferences in-
troduced by Hansen and Sargent (2001). Ambiguity aversion of both parties creates a benefit from
ambiguity-sharing. If moral hazard is not a factor, the optimal contract features a security that
directly includes an equity component, and is interpretable as either convertible debt or levered
equity.
When the entrepreneur’s action is not contractible, the optimal contract must be designed to
provide incentives for effort. The investor now receives more cash in low cash flow states, compared
to the security in the first-best contract. If the entrepreneur is sufficiently risk-averse, the contract
resembles equity in high cash flow states, but has payments to the investors that are non-linear
in the project cash flow. If the entrepreneur has a low degree of ambiguity aversion, the security
can have non-monotone payments that decrease over some range of project cash flow. In this case,
imposing monotonicity of the claims held by both entrepreneur and investors leads to the optimal
security being either plain vanilla debt, or debt that with a conversion option in high cash flow
states.
Our results imply that ambiguity-sharing may underlie the design of venture capital contracts,
which generally feature either an equity component or convertibility. While there are many theories
that lead to the optimality of equity or convertible debt, our model provides a parsimonious and
plausible explanation for the existence of such features.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
First, consider the IR constraint in equation (11). Dividing throughout by −θI , we have
ln
(∫
X
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)dx
)
≤ − I
θI
= ln
(
e
− I
θI
)
.
Taking the exponential of both sides yields the constraint (IR2) exhibited in equation (15).
Next, consider the IC constraint in equation (12). Multiply throughout by −
∫
X e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x|a)dx
θE
to obtain ∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx+ ψ
′(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a)dx = 0,
which is the constraint (IC2) exhibited in equation (16).
Now, observe that the limited liability constraints are identical in problems P1 and P2. As
the IR and IC constraints are also equivalent across these problems, the feasible sets of (r, a) are
identical in both problems.
Finally, consider the objective function in problem P1, as exhibited in equation (10). Denote
Φ(r, a) = −θE ln
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
− ψ(a). Then,
Φ(r, a) = −θE
[
ln
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
+
ψ(a)
θE
]
= −θE
[
ln
(∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
+ ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE
)]
= −θE ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
. (30)
Now, maximizing Φ(r, a) is equivalent to minimizing− 1θE Φ(r, a) = ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx
)
.
Finally, minimizing the last expression is equivalent to minimizing its exponential,
e
ψ(a)
θE
∫
X
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)dx. The latter is the object being minimized in equation (14) in Problem
P2.
The problems P1 and P2 are therefore equivalent, and must have the same solution sets.
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Note that, as I > 0, the investors’ IR constraint can only be satisfied if r(x) > 0 over some
set of positive measure, Y ⊆ X. Now, suppose the IR constraint is slack and the optimal security
is r˜(x), so that
∫
X e
− r˜(x)
θI f(x | a)dx < e−
I
θI . For some  > 0, set rˆ(x) = r˜(x) −  if x ∈ Y and
rˆ(x) = r˜(x) if x 6∈ Y . As r˜(x) > 0 for all x ∈ Y , there exists some  > 0 such that rˆ(x) ≥ 0 for
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x ∈ Y and ∫X e− rˆ(x)θI f(x | a)dx < e− IθI . It is immediate that the security rˆ(x) yields a higher payoff
to the entrepreneur than r˜(x), so that r˜(x) cannot be an optimal security.
(ii) Optimize the Lagrangian pointwise with respect to r(x). At a fixed value of x, the first-order
condition
∂Lf
∂r = 0 yields
e
ψ(a)
θE
θE
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)− λ
θI
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)− γ
x
+ γx = 0[
e
−x−r(x)
θE
+
ψ(a)
θE − λθE
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
]
f(x | a)
θE
= γ
x
− γx. (31)
Now, there are three cases to consider.
Case 1: γ
x
> 0. Then, r(x) = 0 by complementary slackness, so it follows that γx = 0. Equation
(31) reduces to [
e
−x+ψ(a)
θE − λθE
θI
]
f(x | a)
θE
= γ
x
. (32)
As f(x|a)θE > 0, it follows that e
−x+ψ(a)
θE > λθEθI . Taking natural logs on both sides and rearrang-
ing, we have
x < ψ(a)− θE ln
(
λθE
θI
)
. (33)
As x > 0, there exist values of x for which this case is feasible only if ln
(
λθE
θI
)
< ψ(a)θE .
Case 2: γx > 0. Then, r(x) = x by complementary slackness, so it follows that γx = 0. Equation
(31) reduces to [
e
ψ(a)
θE − λθE
θI
e
− x
θI
]
f(x | a)
θE
= −γx. (34)
As f(x|a)θE > 0, it follows that e
ψ(a)
θE < λθEθI e
− x
θI . Taking natural logs on both sides and
rearranging, we have
x < θI
[
ln
(
λθE
θI
)
− ψ(a)
θE
]
. (35)
As x > 0, there exist values of x for which this case is feasible only if ln
(
λθE
θI
)
< ψ(a)θE .
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Case 3: γx = γx = 0. Then, r(x) ∈ (0, x). Here, equation (31) reduces to[
e
−x−r(x)
θE
+
ψ(a)
θE − λθE
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
]
f(x | a)
θE
= 0. (36)
As f(x|a)θE > 0, it must be that e
−x−r(x)
θE
+
ψ(a)
θE = λθEθI e
− r(x)
θI . Taking natural logs on both sides,
we have
− x
θE
+
r(x)
θE
+
ψ(a)
θE
= ln
(
λθE
θI
)
− r(x)
θI
r(x) =
θI
θI + θE
x+
θIθE
θI + θE
(
ln
(
λθE
θI
)
− ψ(a)
θE
)
. (37)
Now, let λf and af be the values of λ and a when the Lagrangian has been optimized. Denote
the RHS of (37), evaluated at λ = λf and a = af , by rˆ(x). It follows that if rˆ(x) ∈ (0, x), then
rf (x) = rˆ(x). If rˆ(x) < 0, then rf (x) = 0, so that we are in Case 1. Note that this case can occur
only if ln
(
λθE
θI
)
< ψ(a)θE . Finally, if rˆx > x, then rf (x) = x, putting us in Case 2. Note that this
case can occur only if ln
(
λθE
θI
)
> ψ(a)θE .
Substitute ψ(a)θE = ln e
ψ(a)
θE . Then, the contract in the statement of the proposition, in equation
(19), succinctly describes the three cases.
Proof of Proposition 2
We prove part (ii) first and then part (i).
(ii) The proof of part (ii) closely mirrors the proof of Propostion 1 (ii).
Optimize the Lagrangian pointwise with respect to r(x). At a fixed value of x, the first-order
condition ∂L∂r = 0 yields
e
ψ(a)
θE
θE
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)− λ
θI
e
− r(x)
θI f(x | a)
+
µ
θE
(
e
−x−r(x)
θE fa(x | a) + ψ
′(a)
θE
e
−x−r(x)
θE f(x | a)
)
− γ
x
+ γx = 0
e
−x−r(x)
θE
[
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
− λθE
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
+
x−r(x)
θE
]
f(x | a)
θE
= γ
x
− γx. (38)
Now, there are three cases to consider.
Case 1: γ
x
> 0. Then, r(x) = 0 by complementary slackness, so it follows that γx = 0. Equation
(38) reduces to
e
− x
θE
[
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
− λθE
θI
e
x
θE
]
f(x | a)
θE
= γ
x
. (39)
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As e
− x
θE , f(x | a), and θE are all strictly positive, it follows that
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
>
λθE
θI
e
x
θE . (40)
Taking natural logs on both sides, we have
ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
))
> ln
λθE
θI
+
x
θE
. (41)
Recall that, by MLRP, fa(x|a)f(x|a) is strictly increasing in x. Therefore, both sides of the last equa-
tion are strictly increasing in x. Therefore, the equation ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x|a)
f(x|a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
))
=
ln λθEθI +
x
θE
can have zero or multiple roots, depending on parameters.
Case 2: γx > 0. Then, r(x) = x by complementary slackness, so it follows that γx = 0. Equation
(38) reduces to[
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
− λθE
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
]
f(x | a)
θE
= −γx. (42)
As f(x|a)θE > 0, it follows that
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
<
λθE
θI
e
− x
θI
ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
))
< ln
λθE
θI
− x
θI
. (43)
The LHS of the last equation is strictly increasing in x, and the RHS is strictly decreasing.
Therefore, either (a) the inequality is violated for all x ≥ 0, or (b) there exists a threshold xˆ
such that the inequality holds for x ≤ xˆ.
Case 3: γ
x
= γx = 0. Then, r(x) ∈ (0, x). Here, equation (38) reduces to
e
−x−r(x)
θE
[
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
− λθE
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
+
x−r(x)
θE
]
f(x | a)
θE
= 0, (44)
which implies that
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
)
=
λθE
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
+
x−r(x)
θE (45)
ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
))
= ln
λθE
θI
− r(x)
θI
+
x− r(x)
θE
. (46)
24
The last equation directly implies that
r(x) =
θI
θI + θE
x+
θIθE
θI + θE
{
ln
λθE
θI
− ln
(
e
ψ(a)
θE + µ
(
fa(x | a)
f(x | a) +
ψ′(a)
θE
))}
. (47)
Now, let a∗, λ∗, and µ∗ denote the values of the respective variables when the Lagrangian has
been optimized. Let rˆ(x) denote the RHS of equation (47). It follows that r∗(x) = rˆ(x) when
rˆ(x) ∈ [0, x], r∗(x) = 0 when rˆ(x) < 0, and r∗(x) = x when rˆ(x) > x. The statement of part (ii)
describes these possibilities in a more succinct manner.
(i) Suppose that the IR constraint does not bind, so that λ∗ = 0. Consider the expression for rˆ(x)
in equation (47). As λ→ 0, regardless of the value of x, the term ln λθEθI → −∞, so it follows that
rˆ(x) < 0 and r(x) = 0. However, if r(x) = 0 for all x, the IR constraint is trivially violated, so we
have a contradiction. Therefore, the IR constraint must bind.
Proof of Proposition 3
As in the proof of Proposition 2, we first show part (ii).
Denote ρ = r′(x). For any given a, the corresponding Hamiltonian (or point-wise Lagrangian)
is
H(x, λ, µ, r(·), ρ(·)) = e
ψ(a)
θE e
−(x−r(x))
θE f(x|a) + λ
(
e
− r(x)
θI f(x|a)− e−I/θI
)
+µ
(
ψ′(a)
θE
e
− (x−r(x))
θE f(x|a) + e−
(x−r(x))
θE fa(x|a)
)
+ ξ(x)ρ(x), (48)
where we temporarily suppress the limited liability constraints 0 ≤ r(x) ≤ x and the constraint
ρ(x) ≤ 1. Further, ξ is the costate variable associated with ρ = r′.
Let r¯(x) be the optimal security given that condition (M) has been imposed. By Pontryagin’s
minimum principle, the necessary conditions for an optimum (r¯(x), ρ(x)) are:
(i) ρ(x) = argmin0≤ρ˜(x)H(x, λ, µ, r¯(·), ρ˜(·)).
(ii) The costate variable associated with ρ(x) satisfies
ξ′(x) = −∂H
∂r
(x). (49)
(iii) Since r(0) = 0 (by limited liability for both investors and entrepreneur), but r(x) can lie in the
range [0, x], the transversality condition of the costate variable is 0 = ξ(x) = − ∫ x0 ∂H∂r (x)dx.
The optimality condition with respect to the control ρ(x) is that, for all x,
ρ(x) = argmin
0≤ρ(x)≤1
H(x, λ, µ, r(·), ρ(·)) = argmin
0≤ρ(x)≤1
ξ(x)ρ(x) (50)
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That is,
ρ(x) =

0 if ξ(x) > 0
1 if ξ(x) < 0
(0, 1) if ξ(x) = 0
(51)
The following cases emerge.
Case 1: ξ(x) = 0 over a range of positive measure, so ξ′(x) = 0 over this range. From equation
(49), we have
∂H
∂r
(x) = e
−w(x)
θE f(x|a)
(
1
θE
e
ψ(a)
θE − λ
θI
e
− r(x)
θI
+
x−r(x)
θE + µ
(
ψ′(a)
θ2E
+
1
θE
fa(x|a)
f(x|a)
))
= 0 (52)
Notice that this last equation coincides with the optimality condition of the security r(x) in
the second-best contract when neither limited liability condition binds. Observe that in this
case r(x) is strictly increasing: r′(x) = ρ(x) ∈ (0, 1).
Case 2: ξ(x) > 0 over some range of positive measure. Then ρ(x) = r′(x) = 0 over this range,
which implies r(x) = c0, for some constant c0 ∈ R. From equation (49), we have
e
−(x−c0)
θE f(x|a)
(
λ
θI
e
x
θE
− θE+θI
θIθE
c0 − µ 1
θE
fa(x|a)
f(x|a) −
1
θE
e
ψ(a)
θE − µψ
′(a)
θ2E
)
= ξ′(x) (53)
Case 3: ξ(x) < 0 over some range of positive measure. Then ρ(x) = r′(x) = 1, which implies
r(x) = x− cˆ0 and w(x) = cˆ0 for some cˆ0 ∈ R. From (49), we have
e
− cˆ0
θE f(x|a)
(
λ
θI
e
−
(
x
θI
− θI+θE
θEθI
cˆ0
)
− µ 1
θE
fa(x|a)
f(x|a) −
1
θE
e
ψ(a)
θE − µψ
′(a)
θ2E
)
= ξ′(x) (54)
Observe that the mapping
x 7→ λ
θI
e
−
(
x
θI
− θI+θE
θEθI
cˆ0
)
− µ 1
θE
fa(x|a)
f(x|a) −
1
θE
e
ψ(a)
θE − µψ
′(a)
θ2E
(55)
is strictly decreasing in x.
Given the parameters (θE , θI), the optimal values of (a, λ, µ) must satisfy one of the following
cases.
(i) Suppose that ξ(0) > 0. Then, as r(0) = 0 by limited liability for both investors and en-
trepreneur, it follows that c0 = 0. Then, the equation ξ(x) = 0 must have a solution in [0, x].
Otherwise, ξ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0, x], which implies r(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, x], which violates
the investors’ IR constraint. Let xˆ0(a, λ, µ) be such solution. Then, it must be that ξ(x) = 0
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for all x ∈ [xˆ0, x]. To see this, suppose that ξ(x) < 0 for some x˜ ∈ [xˆ0, x]. As the mapping in
equation (55) is strictly decreasing, it must be that ξ′(x) < 0 for all x > x˜. However, in this
case, we have ξ(x) < 0, which violates the boundary condition ξ(x) = 0. Therefore, ξ(x) = 0
on [xˆ0, x] and we have the situation in equation (52).
(ii) Suppose that ξ(0) < 0. Then, as r(0) = 0, it follows that cˆ0 = 0. Also, it must be that
ξ′(0) > 0. Otherwise, we have ξ′(0) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, x], which would lead to a violation
of the boundary condition ξ(x) = 0. With ξ(0) < 0 and ξ′(0) > 0, the function ξ(x) is an
increasing and concave function in x on [0, xˆ0] where xˆ0 = xˆ0(a, λ, µ) is a solution of the
equation ξ(x) = 0. Further, it follows that ξ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [xˆ0, x]. Then,
(a) Suppose that ξ′(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [xˆ0, x]. Then ξ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [xˆ0, x]. Thus
r(x) = r∗(x) on x ∈ [xˆ0, x].
(b) Suppose that ξ′(x) > 0 for some x ∈ [xˆ0, xˆ1] and ξ′(x) < 0 for some x ∈ [xˆ1, xˆ2], where
ξ′(xˆ1) = 0. Then, ξ(x) > 0 for x ∈ [xˆ1, xˆ2]. Hence r(x) is a constant for x ∈ [xˆ1, xˆ2]. The
decreasing mapping in equation (55) and the transversality condition ξ(x) = 0 ensure
that ξ(x) = 0 for x ∈ [xˆ2, x]. That is, r(x) = r∗(x) on [xˆ2, x]. Finally, if xˆ2 = x, then
the security is standard debt.
The function rM (x) in equation (25) encapsulates these various cases.
The proof of part (i) now completely mirrors the proof of Proposition 2, part (i).
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